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INTRODUCTION 
During 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) issued fifteen trademark decisions, eleven 
on substantive issues and four on procedural issues, which was a 
relatively active year.1  However, only a few are precedential 
decisions.2  While most of the court’s decisions readily affirmed the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”), there are a 
few decisions that are particularly noteworthy where the Federal 
Circuit disagreed with either the TTAB’s interpretation or holding. 
For example, in In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft,3 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the Board’s refusal to consider foreign-based online news 
sources as evidence of United States public perception, finding that 
even information originating from foreign sources may be relevant to 
United States consumers’ impressions of a proposed mark if such 
information is available on the Internet.4
In another case, the Federal Circuit clarified that mere use in the 
United States, not use in U.S. commerce, is sufficient to sustain an 
opposition before the Board.5  It further noted (albeit in a footnote) 
 1.  By comparison, the court issued seventeen decisions in 2003, thirteen 
decisions in 2004, twelve decisions in 2005, and ten decisions in 2006. 
 2.  See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(failure to state a claim); In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(definition of goods); China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (likelihood of confusion); In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 
960, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (mere descriptiveness); In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482 
F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (genericness); FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc. v. 
Carefirst of Md., Inc., 479 F.3d 825, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (excusable neglect); In re 
Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (res judicata); First Niagara Ins. 
Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagra Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(mere use versus use in commerce). 
 3.  488 F.3d at 960. 
 4.  Id. at 969. 
 5.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871. 
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that the Board should apply the correct legal standard even where 
the parties allege the higher, incorrect standard.6
In the only written opinion involving the likelihood of confusion 
analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s finding that the 
mark CHI PLUS did not infringe upon the mark CHI (design) for 
identical goods, finding the Board had improperly dissected the 
marks and failed to accord sufficient weight to fame evidence.7
Disturbingly, a few opinions involved errors by counsel.  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed two Board holdings finding no “excusable 
neglect” for failure to meet deadlines.8  However, in an opinion 
affirmed per curiam, the Federal Circuit did not disturb the Board’s 
acceptance of a late-filed brief or relief from untimely admission 
responses, in that case looking beyond procedural defects as the 
merits of the case would be subserved.9
Overall, most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions affirmed the 
Board’s holdings save for the few noted above and discussed herein, 
consistent with the great deference the court gives to agency 
decisions. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Genericness 
1. In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.10
In In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.,11 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s refusal to register the trademark WWW.LAWYERS.COM as 
generic, confirming that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) can look beyond the goods and services recited in a 
trademark application to determine whether a mark is descriptive or 
generic.12
In 1998, Reed Elsevier (“Reed”) applied to register 
WWW.LAWYERS.COM as a trademark for “[p]roviding access to an 
online interactive database featuring information exchange in the 
 6.  Id. at 871 n.1. 
 7.  China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1341. 
 8.  FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Md., Inc., 479 F.3d 825, 828–
30 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Fischer v. Anderson, No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, at *3 
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007). 
 9.  Stichting Lodestar v. Austin Nichols & Co., 214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam). 
 10.  482 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 1378. 
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fields of law, lawyers, legal news, and legal services.”13  After 
determining that the website at WWW.LAWYERS.COM allows users 
to research lawyers, ask questions of lawyers and contact lawyers,14 the 
examining attorney rejected the mark as generic of the services 
identified in Reed’s trademark application.15
In what became one of the main issues on appeal, Reed attempted 
to salvage its application by deleting “lawyers,” leaving only 
“information exchange . . . in the fields of law, legal news, and legal 
services” in its recital of goods and services, and re-submitted its 
application for registration on the Supplemental Register.16  The 
examining attorney again rejected the application based on 
genericness.17  The Board affirmed the examining attorney’s ultimate 
refusal, finding that information about legal services is “inextricably” 
related to information about lawyers, and that the public would 
perceive the mark WWW.LAWYERS.COM as primarily referring to 
information about lawyers.18
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the evidence 
substantially supported the Board’s finding that 
WWW.LAWYERS.COM constitutes a generic mark.19  Reed did not 
dispute that the public would perceive WWW.LAWYERS.COM as 
primarily relating to lawyers.20  The issue on appeal was whether the 
Board had erred in considering all of the services offered at 
www.lawyers.com in finding its mark generic.”21  According to Reed, 
the Board should have limited its inquiry to whether 
WWW.LAWYERS.COM is generic for information about legal news 
and legal services.22
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 1377. 
 15.  Id. at 1378.  To prove that a mark is generic, the Federal Circuit follows a 
two-step inquiry:  “First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue?  Second, is the 
term sought to be registered . . . understood by the relevant public primarily to refer 
to that genus of goods or services?”  Id. (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of 
Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 16.  Id. at 1377–78.  Descriptive trademarks may be registered on the 
Supplemental Register if they have not yet acquired secondary meaning.  JEROME 
GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
(TMEP) § 1212.02(c) (4th ed. 2005). 
 17.  Read, 482 F.3d at 1378. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  The issue of genericness is treated by the Federal Circuit as a question of 
fact.  Id.  The Federal Circuit reviews questions of fact by asking whether the Board’s 
decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 1379–80. 
 21.  Id. at 1379. 
 22.  Id. at 1378–79. 
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The Federal Circuit concluded that that the evidence substantially 
supported the Board’s holding.23  It held that the Board (1) properly 
reviewed the website at WWW.LAWYERS.COM in order to give 
meaning to the term “legal services” and (2) properly determined 
that a necessary facet of legal services is information about lawyers.24  
The court therefore agreed with the Board that information about 
legal services is “inextricably intertwined” with information about 
lawyers25 and rejected Reed’s argument that the Board had 
considered services outside the scope of “information exchange in 
the field of . . . legal services.”26  Once the Federal Circuit found that 
the genus encompassed information about lawyers, it found that 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the public 
would understand WWW.LAWYERS.COM to primarily relate to the 
genus of services at issue.27
Reed may not involve a novel application of the genericness test.  
However, it does remind practitioners that the Board may look 
beyond the goods and services recited in a trademark application to 
inform its decision on whether a mark is descriptive or generic.28
B. Mere Descriptiveness 
1. In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft29
In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft30 posed the question of whether 
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin and analgesic goods and 
therefore not allowable as a trademark.31  This case presents an 
interesting study into the weight accorded to various forms of 
evidence, especially foreign articles accessible over the Internet, and 
highlights the difficulty of appealing a factual determination by the 
Board due to the Federal Circuit’s deferential “substantial evidence” 
standard of review.32
 23.  Id. at 1378. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 1379. 
 26.  Id. at 1378. 
 27.  Id. at 1380. 
 28.  See In re Univ. Fed. Credit Union, No. 78439822, 2007 WL 2219700, at *3 
(T.T.A.B. July 23, 2007) (“[I]t is appropriate for the Board to consider the 
applicant’s website to understand the meaning of the goods of the services for which 
registration is sought.”). 
 29.  488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 962. 
 32.  See id. at 970 (“Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of 
review . . . [w]here two different conclusions may be warranted based on the 
evidence of record, the Board’s decision to favor one conclusion over the other is the 
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Bayer is the owner of the mark ASPIRINA for aspirin and analgesic 
goods in thirty-four countries worldwide.33  In 2003, Bayer filed an 
intent-to-use application to register ASPIRINA in connection with 
aspirin and analgesic goods in the United States.34  Both the 
examining attorney and the Board rejected the application for 
ASPIRINA as merely descriptive of the goods at issue and Bayer 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.35
The issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence supported 
the Board’s finding that ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin 
and analgesic goods.36  In line with established precedent, the Federal 
Circuit stated that “[a] term is merely descriptive if it immediately 
conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of 
the goods or services with which it is used.”37  Also in line with 
established precedent, the Federal Circuit analyzed both the term 
itself and how it is perceived in a marketplace context by average 
purchasers of the goods.38
As to the appearance, sound and meaning of the term ASPIRINA, 
the Federal Circuit found that the mere addition of the letter “A” is 
“insufficient to transform ASPIRINA into an inherently distinctive 
mark for analgesics.”39  It held that (1) the appearance is virtually 
identical to the generic term aspirin and therefore immediately 
conveys the characteristics of the goods, and that (2) the meaning is 
identical because both ASPIRINA and aspirin identify analgesic 
goods.40  Lastly, the Federal Circuit remarked that slight differences 
in pronunciation cannot overcome the substantial evidence that 
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin.41
Taken in its marketplace context, the Federal Circuit likewise 
found substantial evidence to support the Board’s holding that 
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive.42  The examining attorney proffered 
a wide array of evidence showing the descriptive nature of the term 
type of decision that must be sustained by this court as supported by substantial 
evidence.”). 
 33.  Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 34.  Id. at 962. 
 35.  Id. at 963.  The Board held that “consumers will view ASPIRINA as merely a 
variation or misspelling of the generic term aspirin and determined that the terms 
are close in sound, appearance, and meaning [and] that ASPIRINA immediately 
conveys the impression that Bayer’s analgesics are aspirin-based products.”  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 964. 
 37.  Id. at 963. 
 38.  Id. at 964. 
 39.  Id. at 965. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 970. 
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ASPIRINA, including online translation results, paper dictionary 
results, search engine results, and foreign and domestic online news 
articles.43  In evaluating the record, the Federal Circuit found 
substantial evidence that ASPIRINA is used as the Spanish language 
equivalent of the generic term aspirin and would therefore be 
perceived by the United States public as merely descriptive of aspirin 
and analgesic goods.44
In reviewing the Board’s holding, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
the principle that Internet evidence is generally admissible in 
trademark disputes as indicative of public perception and also 
provided significant insight into the probative value of each type of 
Internet evidence before it.45
The court first reaffirmed the principle that free online translation 
results are admissible as evidence of public perception.46  It next held, 
in line with the lower courts, that Google search results are of “little 
value” because they do not illustrate the full context in which the 
mark appears.47  Last, and perhaps most significant, the Federal 
Circuit reversed the Board’s refusal to consider foreign-based online 
news sources as evidence of United States public perception.48  The 
court held that the Internet is a growing resource for news and that 
“[i]nformation originating on foreign websites or in foreign news 
publications that are accessible to the United States public may be 
relevant to discern United States consumer impression of a proposed 
mark.”49  This statement should end disparate treatment of the issue 
by examiners and the TTAB50 and is already being cited by the TTAB 
for this proposition.51
 43.  Id. at 965–70. 
 44.  Id. at 970.  Although the Federal Circuit explicitly declined to undertake an 
analysis of foreign equivalents, Judge Newman, in dissent, criticized the majority for 
relying on evidence showing the term ASPIRINA to be the foreign equivalent of a 
generic term and then using that evidence to support its finding of mere 
descriptiveness.  Id. at 973. 
 45.  See id. at 966 (“Internet evidence is generally admissible and may be 
considered for purposes of evaluating a trademark.”) (citation omitted); see also 
GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 710.01(b) (“Articles downloaded from the 
Internet are admissible as evidence of information available to the general public, 
and of the way in which a term is being used by the public.  However, the weight 
given to this evidence must be carefully evaluated, because the source is often 
unknown.”). 
 46.  In re Bayer, 488 F.3d at 966 (noting that if the public accesses such services, 
they are probative of public perception). 
 47.  Id. at 967. 
 48.  Id. at 969. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Compare In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, No. 78212751, 2005 WL 3395183, at 
*3 n.3 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2005) (noting that U.S. consumers are exposed to 
translations of foreign websites), with In re King Koil Licensing Co., No. 76565486, 
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2. In re Finisar Corp.52
In In re Finisar Corp.,53 the Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the 
Board’s holding that SMARTSFP is merely descriptive of optical 
transceivers.54  The Board’s analysis involves a straightforward 
application of the descriptiveness test, illustrating the difference 
between a descriptive and suggestive mark.55
A mark is descriptive if “it immediately conveys information 
concerning a quality, characteristic, function, ingredient, attribute or 
feature of the product or service in connection with which it is used, 
or intended to be used.”56  The mark must be considered in relation 
to the goods and services listed in the application and in light of the 
average purchaser’s perception of the mark.57
The issue on appeal was whether SFP and SMART, taken together, 
are merely descriptive of optical receivers.58  While the Board noted 
that SFP is an acronym for “small form-factor pluggable” optical 
receivers,59 Finisar argued that average consumers are unaware of the 
acronym SFP and would not immediately connect SFP with optical 
receivers.60  The Board responded that ordinary customers of Finisar’s 
goods—the proper standard—would immediately recognize the term 
2006 WL 639160, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2006) (refusing to consider that U.S. 
consumers would turn to foreign websites), and In re Remacle, No. 75932290, 2002 
WL 31563187, at *2–3 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2002) (reversing a decision in which 
foreign materials were used as evidence against the applicant). 
 51.  See, e.g., In re The Univ. of B.C., No. 78700787, 2007 WL 3095398 (T.T.A.B. 
Oct. 18, 2007); In re Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 78518703, 2007 WL 2972210 
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 20, 2007); In re SJP, LLC, No. 76620345, 2007 WL 2698287 (T.T.A.B. 
Aug. 31, 2007); In re Grape Tech. Group, Inc., No. 76578484, 2007 WL 2344676 
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2007); In re Salzgitter Flachstahl GMBH, No. 79007387, 2007 WL 
1893923, at *5 (T.T.A.B. June 27, 2007) (“The Federal Circuit recently endorsed and 
encouraged the use of these foreign Internet publications.”). 
 52.  223 F. App’x 984 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 985. 
 55.  In re Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618, 1619 (T.T.A.B. 2006), aff’d, 223 F. 
App’x 984 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 56.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 1618–19.  Optical receivers are “highly automated devices that imitate 
human intelligence by self monitoring and reporting operational and diagnostic 
information.”  Id. at 1621. 
 59.  Id. at 1619.  In so doing, the Board relied on the website http://www.acrony 
mfinder.com.  Id.  This website is similar to Wikipedia insofar as users can develop 
and edit their own entries.  See generally John L. Welch, The Board’s Eye-View:  Six 
Potential Pitfalls in Trademark Prosecution 13–15, http://www.ll-a.com/welch/ATD 
_Six_Pitfalls.pdf (questioning the reliability of the acronym website). 
 60.  Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619. 
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as referring to Finisar’s optical receivers.61  Accordingly, the Board 
found SFP descriptive of optical transceivers.62
Next, the Board observed that the definition of SMART includes 
“highly automated” and “containing electronic control devices.”63  
The Board also found significant evidence in the form of third-party 
websites showing “smart” in connection with transceivers.64  Finisar 
again took the query out of context, arguing that “smart” is a broad 
and general term that does not immediately convey a consistent 
meaning.65  However, in the context of optical receivers, the Board 
found that SMART immediately conveyed the characteristic that 
Finisar’s goods are “highly automated and capable of computing 
information.”66  Accordingly, the Board found that the term SMART 
is also merely descriptive when used in connection with optical 
receivers.67
The Board ultimately held that the “straightforward combination” 
of SMARTSFP does not create an incongruous or unique commercial 
impression, or require mental pause or thought to determine the 
nature of the goods.68  Thus, SMARTSFP is merely descriptive of 
automated optical transceivers.69  This case serves as a reminder that 
acronyms can be found merely descriptive70 and that two descriptive 
terms, when presented in a “straightforward combination” without 
design elements, do not automatically become a suggestive mark.71
C. Likelihood of Confusion 
The Federal Circuit issued three opinions in 2007 involving claims 
of a likelihood of confusion.72  Two of these opinions were issued per 
curiam affirming the Board’s holdings, demonstrating the Federal 
 61.  Id. at 1620. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 1622. 
 65.  Id. at 1621. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 1620. 
 68.  Id. at 1623. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See, e.g., In re Sanofi-Aventis, No. 78278816, 2006 WL 2303376, at *6 
(T.T.A.B. July 24, 2006) (“[E]ven acronyms may be merely descriptive of an 
applicant’s goods or services.” (citation omitted)). 
 71.  Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1623. 
 72.  See China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Suzlon Wind Energy Corp., 214 F. App’x 987 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co., 214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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Circuit’s deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review for the 
Board’s factual findings.73
1. Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co.74
In Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co.,75 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, per curiam, the Board’s decision that applicant Stichting’s 
mark WILD GEESE for beers, colas, and alcoholic beverages 
infringed upon opposer Austin, Nichols & Co.’s (“Austin Nichols”) 
mark WILD TURKEY for various alcoholic beverages.76
Before addressing the substantive issue presented by this case, the 
Board addressed numerous mistakes committed by Austin Nichols 
throughout the opposition proceeding.77  Fortunately for Austin 
Nichols, failures to timely submit its admissions responses and main 
brief did not affect it in the present case, as the Board (and Federal 
Circuit) were willing to look beyond procedural defects as the merits 
of the case would be subserved.78
Austin Nichols failed to timely serve its responses to applicant’s first 
set of admissions.79  As a result, Austin Nichols was faced with multiple 
default admissions and moved the Board to accept its late responses.80  
The Board treated its motion as one to withdraw its default 
admissions under Federal Rule 36(b).81  Federal Rule 36(b) asks 
whether “the merits of the action will be subserved” by the motion to 
withdraw and whether the party opposing the motion will be 
prejudiced by the withdrawal.82  Because some of the applicant’s 
questions asked Austin Nichols to admit facts that were patently 
untrue—i.e., that WILD TURKEY is not used in connection with 
whiskey—the Board found that the merits of the case would be 
 73.  In the likelihood of confusion analysis in the Federal Circuit, the Board’s 
conclusion on each confusion factor is a factual determination reviewed under the 
“substantial evidence” standard of review while the ultimate legal conclusion as to 
whether confusion is likely—which involves a weighing of the factors—is reviewed de 
novo.  China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1339. 
 74.  214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Stichting Lodestar, No. 91155165, 2006 WL 236409, 
at *1. 
 77.  Id. at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2006). 
 78.  See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (explaining the Board’s 
reasoning). 
 79.  Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *1. 
 80.  Id. at *1–2. 
 81.  Id. at *2. 
 82.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b) (stating that admissions may be withdrawn if “the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that 
party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.”). 
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subserved by the withdrawal of Austin Nichols’ admissions.83  It also 
found that the applicant would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal.84
Austin Nichols also submitted its main brief on the case two days 
late.85  Its brief was due on a Saturday and counsel for Austin Nichols 
did not submit the brief until the following Monday.86  Taking Austin 
Nichols’ excuse at face value that the delay was not willful, the Board 
accepted Austin Nichols brief “because it benefits the Board in its 
ability to make a just determination of the case to have the briefs of 
both parties of record.”87
In applying the likelihood of confusion factors,88 the Board focused 
on the following factors, often considered the most important of the 
thirteen factors:  (1) fame of the prior mark, (2) similarities between 
the marks, and (3) similarities between the goods and/or services.89
Of great importance to Austin Nichols was the fame of the WILD 
TURKEY mark.90  The Board emphasized Austin Nichols’ length of 
use (over sixty years), widespread sales ($65 million and 500,000 cases 
of whiskey sold), advertising expenditures (over $10 million), strong 
brand identity, point-of-sale marketing, and media exposure.91  
 83.  Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *2. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at *3. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  The Federal Circuit applies a thirteen-factor test to determine whether 
consumer confusion is likely, which considers the following factors: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation[,] and commercial impression[;] (2) [t]he 
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in 
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in 
use[;] (3) [t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue 
trade channels[;] (4) [t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom 
sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing[;] 
(5) [t]he fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use)[;] 
(6) [t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods[;] 
(7) [t]he nature and extent of any actual confusion[;] (8) [t]he length of 
time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use 
without evidence of actual confusion[;] (9) [t]he variety of goods on which a 
mark is or is not used (house mark, “family” mark, product mark)[;] 
(10) [t]he market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior 
mark[;] (11) [t]he extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others 
from use of its mark on its goods[;] (12) [t]he extent of potential confusion, 
i.e., whether de minimis or substantial[; and] (13) [a]ny other established fact 
probative of the effect of use. 
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 89.  Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *6–7. 
 90.  See id. (underscoring the importance of fame as one of the DuPont factors 
used for determining consumer confusion). 
 91.  Id. 
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Stichting did not present any rebuttal evidence, and the Board found 
the WILD TURKEY mark famous and entitled to broad protection.92
Citing well-settled law, the Board noted that goods need not be 
identical or directly competitive to be considered similar.93  However, 
the Board found that the goods in the parties’ registrations, beer and 
alcoholic beverages, were identical or nearly identical.94  Given the 
great similarity between the goods, the Board found that two 
additional DuPont factors—the marketing channels and class of 
purchasers—also favored Austin Nichols.95
On the issue of the similarity of the marks, the Board found that 
WILD GEESE and WILD TURKEY are similar “when compared in 
their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation and 
commercial impression.”96  Specifically, it found that each mark 
contained the word WILD in combination with a game bird, which 
gave rise to a confusingly similar commercial impression when used 
in connection with beer and alcoholic beverages.97
The Board was unswayed by Stichting’s arguments on the 
(dis)similarity of the marks.  First, Stichting dissected the marks in its 
analysis,98 violating the long-standing anti-dissection rule of trademark 
law.99  Stichting also proffered third-party registrations, ostensibly 
showing that the common term WILD has “ordinary significance” in 
the field of beverages.100  However, the Board found that the word 
WILD in the third party registrations had disparate meanings and 
connotations and therefore carried little weight.101
Given Austin Nichols’ strong showing on five of the likelihood of 
confusion factors, the Board concluded that Stichting’s mark was 
barred from registration under § 2(d) of the Federal Trademark 
Act.102
 92.  Id. at *7. 
 93.  See id. (opining that the goods need only be related in some manner such 
that consumers encountering the goods in the marketplace could believe that they 
come from the same source (citing In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984))). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at *8. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at *8–10. 
 98.  Id. at *10. 
 99.  See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that 
“marks must be compared in their entireties and must be considered in connection 
with the particular goods or services for which they are used” (citation omitted)). 
 100.  Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *9. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at *10; see infra note 179. 
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2. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association v. Suzlon Wind 
Energy Corp.103
In National Rural Electric Cooperative Association v. Suzlon Wind Energy 
Corp,104 yet another per curiam decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the Board’s holding that Suzlon Wind Energy Corporation’s 
(“Suzlon”) design mark did not infringe the design mark of National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association (“National Rural”).105
This case began as a cancellation proceeding before the 
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board in 2004.106  National Rural 
petitioned to cancel Suzlon’s mark on the basis that confusion was 
likely between its mark:107
 
 
 
 
 
 
and Suzlon’s mark:108
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Board first assessed the similarity of the marks in terms of 
appearance, sound, and connotation, finding differences in the 
appearance of the marks because Suzlon’s mark consists of three 
lines versus National Rural’s five.109  The Board also found differences 
in connotation, finding that the marks are abstract and, therefore, 
open to endless interpretation by consumers.110  On the question of 
sound, the Board said it would be “remiss” to overlook the “important 
difference” of an arbitrary word mark in Suzlon’s design.111  National 
Rural argued that some of its association members display their name 
underneath the National Rural logo, much like Suzlon’s mark, but 
 103.  214 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at *1. 
 106.  Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Suzlon Wind Energy Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1881, 1882 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 1882–83. 
 109.  Id. at 1884. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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the Board was not convinced.112  Overall, the Board found the degree 
of similarity “not great.”113
On the relatedness of the goods and services, the Board is bound 
by those identified in the parties’ registrations.114  National Rural’s 
registration covers publications, workshops, seminars, and association 
services in the field of rural electrification, while Suzlon’s registration 
covers wind turbines and their components.115
National Rural argued that the goods are directly related, noting 
that its associational services include wind energy counseling and 
stressing Suzlon’s admission that “the goods and services used with 
the respective marks fall in the energy industry.”116  However, the 
Board rejected this assertion, concluding that even a passing review 
of the goods and services revealed that they were neither identical 
nor closely related.117  The Board further noted that “[m]erely 
because parties operate in the same broad industry does not, by itself, 
establish that their goods and services are related.”118  Accordingly, 
the Board found that the goods and services were at best “tenuously” 
related.119
When considering the sophistication of consumers and the care 
taken in purchasing the parties’ goods and services, the Board found 
that purchasers of wind turbines and energy cooperatives are 
sophisticated and exercise care in purchasing turbines and joining 
energy associations.120  These factors favored Suzlon.121
National Rural proffered evidence that one of its customers saw 
Suzlon’s mark and thought it belonged to National Rural.122  Even 
though actual confusion is normally afforded great weight in the 
confusion analysis,123 the Board was not swayed by the evidence.  In 
this “single instance of alleged actual confusion,” the customer had 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. (relying on Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901 
(C.C.P.A. 1973), to show that using only the description of goods and services 
provided in the registration is a well-established TTAB practice). 
 115.  Id. at 1885. 
 116.  Id. (quoting National Rural’s brief). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. (citing Saks & Co. v. Snack Food Ass’n, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1835 
(T.T.A.B. 1989)); see Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“[A] broad general market category is not a generally reliable test of 
relatedness of products.”). 
 119.  Nat’l Rural, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1886. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. (“A showing of actual confusion would of course be highly probative, if 
not conclusive, of a high likelihood of confusion.” (quoting In re Majestic Distilling 
Co., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
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failed to consider the goods and services offered in connection with 
the mark.124  Accordingly, the Board found the evidence equivocal 
and insignificant.125
Overall, the Board found confusion unlikely.126  This is an 
interesting case where the inclusion of a word in a design mark was 
an “important difference” in assessing mark similarity.127  Further, this 
case is an instructive example of how goods and services are not 
necessarily related even when marketed within the same broad 
industry. 
3. China Healthways Institute, Inc. v. Wang128
The Federal Circuit issued only one written opinion in 2007 
involving the likelihood of confusion analysis.129  In China Healthways 
Institute, Inc. v. Wang,130 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s 
finding that the trademark CHI PLUS does not infringe upon the 
mark CHI, holding that the marks are confusingly similar and the 
goods, consumers, and marketing channels identical.131
This dispute involves competitors who both wished to use the mark 
CHI in connection with electric massagers.132  In 2002, Wang applied 
for trademark protection for the mark CHI PLUS in connection with 
electric massage apparatuses.133  China Healthways Institute, Inc. 
(“China Healthways”) already owned a trademark registration for 
CHI, in connection with electric therapeutic massagers, and opposed 
Wang’s application.134
In its initial ruling below, the Board rejected China Healthways’ 
opposition, finding confusion unlikely.135  Significantly, the Board 
found the marks to be dissimilar.  The Board “found that ‘CHI’ is a 
weak component of the marks, and the other components of the 
marks adequately distinguish them.”136  To support its conclusion that 
CHI was a weak component, the Board found that “chi” means vital 
energy in Chinese and is suggestive, if not descriptive, of the 
 124.  Id. at 1887. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 1884. 
 128.  491 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 129.  Id. at 1339. 
 130.  Id. at 1337. 
 131.  Id. at 1341. 
 132.  Id. at 1339. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
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massagers.137  The Board then found that differences such as the 
lettering, design elements, and the addition of the word PLUS 
sufficiently distinguished the two marks.138
The issue before the Federal Circuit on appeal turned primarily on 
the similarity of the marks.139  In that appeal, the court found that the 
Board violated the longstanding anti-dissection rule of trademark 
law.140  Specifically, the Federal Circuit rejected a comparison that 
eliminated portions of marks and then simply compared the 
remainder.141  Instead, according to the court, the correct comparison 
involves consideration of the marks in their entirety and in light of 
their respective commercial impressions.142
In particular, the Federal Circuit objected to the Board’s disposal 
of the word mark CHI on the grounds that the word is descriptive 
and thus a weak component of the overall marks.143  The Federal 
Circuit first explained that the word “chi” does not mean electric 
massager and is therefore not a descriptive component of the mark.144  
Further, the word CHI is an “integral” and “major component” of 
both marks,145 and minor distinctions, such as the lettering, design 
elements, and the word PLUS146 did not render the marks dissimilar 
when viewed in their entirety and in light of their overall commercial 
impressions.147
After reversing the Board on its finding of mark similarity, the 
court further noted that the Board should have accepted China 
Healthways’ evidence of actual confusion “to the extent that it was 
 137.  Id. at 1339–40. 
 138.  Id. at 1340. 
 139.  Id. at 1339. 
 140.  See id. at 1340 (noting that trademarks must be examined as a whole, 
especially when “the overall commercial impression is reasonably based on the 
entirety of the marks” (citation omitted)). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 1341. 
 144.  Id.  Interestingly, elsewhere in the opinion the Federal Circuit noted that 
“[t]he word CHI has significant descriptive aspects that raise the likelihood of 
confusion and weigh against registration of multiple marks for identical goods.”  Id. 
at 1340.  This belies the principle alluded to by the Board that weak common 
elements reduce the likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Cont’l Grain Co. v. Cent. Soya 
Co., No. 95-1249, 1995 WL 649500, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 1995) (“Where the 
common element of conflicting marks is ‘weak’ in the sense that such portion is 
descriptive, highly suggestive, or is in common use by many sellers in the market, 
then this reduces the likelihood of confusion.” (citation omitted)). 
 145.  China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1340–41. 
 146.  The court noted that the word “plus” normally connotes a superior product, 
not a wholly different one.  Id. at 1341. 
 147.  Id. 
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properly proffered.”148  Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that 
the Board erred in its assessment of the fame of the mark CHI.149  
Because fame is partially measured by sales volume and length of 
advertising, and China Healthways had sold tens of thousands of its 
massagers over more than ten years, the Federal Circuit found that 
the Board had accorded insufficient weight to CHI on the fame 
factor.150
China Healthways may prove to be an important case to watch 
considering that the Federal Circuit offered conflicting opinions on 
the descriptiveness of the mark CHI.  At one point, the court stated 
that CHI does not mean electric massagers (and is therefore not 
descriptive).151  At another, however, it stated that CHI has 
“significant descriptive aspects.”152  Taking the final position that CHI 
is not descriptive, the court’s criticism of the Board’s dissection of the 
mark is sound.  However, if the mark CHI in fact does have 
significant descriptive aspects, then the Board properly followed 
Federal Circuit precedent that allows the elimination of weak aspects 
and comparison of the residue.153
D. Definition of Goods 
1. In re Omega SA154
In In re Omega SA,155 the Federal Circuit upheld the USPTO’s 
refusal to register a mark unless the applicant amended its 
application to limit its identification of goods to those specifically 
within International Class 14,156 even though Omega argued that by 
virtue of the class identification, the goods would be understood to 
 148.  Id.  The Federal Circuit did not explain what it meant by “properly 
proffered.”  The court noted that the Board excluded China Healthways’s evidence 
because it was not introduced during the assigned testimony period.  Id.  The Federal 
Circuit did not explain whether the Board was correct or whether it should have 
accepted the evidence outside the assigned period.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 1340; see supra note 144 (highlighting the possible contradiction within 
the Federal Circuit’s opinion). 
 153.  See Cont’l Grain Co. v. Cent. Soya Co., Inc., No. 95-1249, 1995 WL 649500, at 
*2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 1995) (“[T]he Board in its analysis acted within the anti-
dissection rule under our precedent in analyzing the ‘common weak elements’ of the 
marks.”). 
 154.  494 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  The TTAB originally ruled that applicant’s registration was too broad 
because it potentially applied to goods under both Class 14 and Class 9 of the 
International Classification for trademark registration.  Id. at 1363–64. 
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be automatically limited.157  Despite Omega’s concern that the 
limitation of the identification of goods in the registration may 
adversely affect its prior trademark registrations for the same goods 
that did not include the additional restricting language, the Federal 
Circuit accepted the USPTO’s assurance that the imposition of this 
requirement in a subsequent registration would not affect existing 
registrations.158
Omega applied to register the mark AQUA TERRA in Class 14 for 
“jewelry, precious stones; watches, watch straps, watch bracelets and 
parts thereof; chronometers, chronographs, watches made of 
precious metals, watches partly or entirely set with precious stones in 
International Class 14.”159  However, the Trademark Attorney rejected 
the application, stating that “chronographs” can refer to Class 9 time 
recording devices as well as Class 14 watches.160
The USPTO referred “to the online Acceptable Identification of Goods 
and Services Manual,161 which identifies ‘chronographs for use as 
specialized time recording apparatuses’ as classified in International 
Class 9, whereas ‘chronographs for use as watches’ or ‘chronographs 
for use as timepieces’ are in International Class 14.”162  Declining to 
amend its identification, Omega argued that it had “several [existing] 
registered trademarks in Class 14 for use with ‘watches and 
chronographs’ and that the term ‘chronographs’ includes timepieces 
such as watches, whether or not ‘chronographs’ is also used for time 
recording instruments.”163  Omega further asserted that because Class 
14 does not include time recording instruments, the USPTO’s 
requirement to restrict the definition of goods is inconsistent with its 
other registrations in Class 14, specifically a parent Swiss registration 
“based on International Class 14, which includes ‘chronographs 
[watches],’ ‘chronometers,’ and ‘chronometrical instruments.’”164  
Omega next argued “that the term ‘chronograph’ is internationally 
understood in the watch industry, [but did not] dispute that 
 157.  Id. at 1364. 
 158.  Id. at 1365. 
 159.  Id. at 1363 (referencing the original Board decision, In re Omega SA (Omega 
I), No. 78192104, 2005 WL 3175147, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2005)). 
 160.  Id. at 1363–64. 
 161.  The United States has adopted the International Classification for the 
registration of trademarks.  GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 1401.02 (“As of 
September 1, 1973, the international classification of goods and services is the 
primary classification used by the United States, and it applies to all applications filed 
on or after September 1, 1973, and their resulting registrations, for all statutory 
purposes.”  (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.85)). 
 162.  Omega, 494 F.3d at 1364. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. (alteration in original). 
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‘chronograph’ can also designate time recording instruments.”165  
Finally, Omega stated that the “limitation of ‘chronograph’ to 
watches necessarily follows when registration is in International Class 
14, [and that it need not be further limited] since the only 
chronographs in Class 14 are watches.”166
The Federal Circuit confirmed that the definition of goods in one 
registration does not taint the definition of similar goods in any other 
registrations, thereby accepting the USPTO’s arguments that “third 
parties cannot challenge prior registrations based on terminology 
used in an ID in a more recent application/registration,” and that 
there would be no retroactive effect on an applicant’s existing 
registrations or place those prior registrations at risk.167  The Federal 
Circuit held that it is within the USPTO’s “authority to develop 
particularized definitions that are ‘more extensive and specific than 
the Alphabetical List of Goods and Services that is published by 
WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization]’ . . . and to require 
compliance with such definitions.”168  Furthermore, the International 
Classification does not prohibit the imposition of additional 
requirements for national registration.169
Omega expressed concern regarding inconsistent examination 
requirements that place an inappropriate burden on applicants.170  
The Federal Circuit agreed that consistency is “highly desirable” and 
that the time and expense of complying with inconsistent 
applications burdens both the USPTO and the public; however, it 
found that the requirement in this particular case was not so 
unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention into the USPTO 
examination process.171  Finding that the scope of the term 
“chronographs” is ambiguous for registration purposes because it 
includes both watches and time recording devices, the Federal Circuit 
held that the USPTO has “discretion to determine whether and how 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 1365 (quoting the brief filed by the USPTO). 
 168.  Id. (quoting GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 1402.04) (citation 
omitted).  The court in Omega incorrectly attributed the quoted language to 
§ 1401.02(c) of the TMEP.  Id. 
 169.  See id. (illustrating that domestic requirements can differ so long as they do 
not significantly alter the international classifications); GILSON & LALONDE, supra 
note 16, § 1401.02(c) (“[B]ecause the international list was developed to classify 
goods and services and not to identify specific goods and services, most entries will 
not be sufficiently definite to use in an identification of goods or services.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 170.  Omega, 494 F.3d at 1365. 
 171.  Id.; see Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Courts should 
not readily intervene in the day-to-day operations of an administrative agency.”). 
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a trademark registration should include a more particularized 
statement of the goods for which the mark is to be used.”172  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the Trademark Examining 
Attorney’s requirement in “determining that the term 
‘chronographs’ in the registration should be restricted to those ‘for 
use as watches’” was within the USPTO’s discretionary authority.173
E. Use v. Use in Commerce 
1. First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial 
Group, Inc.174
In First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial Group, 
Inc.,175 the Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB decision dismissing an 
opposition to intent-to-use applications and clarified that the “use” 
required to challenge an application for registration is merely “use in 
the United States” and not “use in commerce.”176  The TTAB’s 
analysis of whether the party opposing the trademark’s registration 
had shown use in commerce was unwarranted given the plain language 
of the applicable statute, which merely requires that the prior mark 
be “used in the United States by another.”177
First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. (“FN-US”), an insurance 
brokerage firm, filed intent-to-use applications at the USPTO for 
various marks, including the term FIRST NIAGRA, in connection 
with its insurance brokerage services.178  First Niagara Insurance 
Brokers, Inc. (“FN-Canada”), an insurance broker operating out of 
Canada, opposed each of FN-US’s applications on the basis that FN-
US’s marks were likely to cause confusion with its own.179  FN-Canada 
did not have any physical presence in the United States, such as 
offices, employees, or assets.180  Nor was it licensed to act as an 
 172.  Omega, 494 F.3d at 1365. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 871. 
 177.  Id. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000)). 
 178.  Id. at 869. 
 179.  Id.  In opposing FN-US’s registration, FN-Canada relied on section 2(d) of 
the Lanham Act, which provides that a trademark shall be refused registration if it 
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United 
States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 180.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 868. 
 2008] 2007 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 1059 
                                                          
insurance broker in the United States.181  It did, however, both sell 
insurance policies issued by U.S.-based underwriting companies and 
sell, through insurance brokers in the United States, policies to U.S. 
citizens holding Canadian property.182  FN-Canada does not own any 
registered U.S. trademarks, but regularly uses several unregistered 
marks, including FIRST NIAGRA and FIRST NIAGRA INSURANCE 
BROKERS, in advertising that “spills over” into the United States and 
in correspondence to customers in the United States.183
FN-US argued that FN-Canada “could not establish the priority 
necessary to prevail on a likelihood-of-confusion claim because it had 
not used its marks ‘in commerce’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”184  The 
TTAB dismissed FN-Canada’s protests, reasoning that any 
connections FN-Canada has with the United States were “de minimis 
and merely incidental to [FN-Canada’s] rendering of its insurance 
brokerage services in Canada.”185  The Board further held that 
“[s]uch activities do not constitute rendering of insurance brokerage 
services in either interstate or foreign commerce.”186
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB erroneously 
framed the issue as use in commerce regulated by Congress.187  The 
court held that such an assumption was unwarranted in light of the 
plain language of the statute, which requires only that the prior mark 
be “used in the United States by another.”188  The privilege to claim 
priority under section 2(d) based solely on intrastate use of a mark 
“attaches to all opposers, regardless of whether they are foreign or 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 869. 
 184.  Id.  The referenced section of the Lanham Act defines “use in commerce” as 
the “bona fide use of a [trade]mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely 
to reserve the right to a mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 185.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 869–70 (alteration in original) (quoting First 
Niagara Ins. Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group Inc. (First Niagara I), 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1334, 1344 (T.T.A.B. 2005)). 
 186.  Id. at 870 (quoting First Niagara I, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344) (citation omitted). 
 187.  Id. at 870–71.  Section 45 of the Lanham Act requires that marks be used in 
commerce in order to be registered.  15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). 
 188.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 870 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000)); see Nat’l 
Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Were failure to show ‘use in commerce’ a bar to petitioning for 
cancellation of a registration, a party could never cancel a mark based solely on 
intrastate use.  This is not the law.”).  The Federal Circuit in First Niagara further 
noted that even the Board opinion below stated that “[a]n opposer claiming priority 
under section 2(d) may rely on use that is strictly intrastate and not regulable by 
Congress.”  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871 (quoting First Niagara I, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1341 n.15). 
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domestic.”189  Accordingly, a foreign opposer can oppose a mark 
merely by demonstrating use of its marks in the United States.190
The court noted that, despite the plain language of the statute 
requiring mere use and the precedent of National Cable Television 
Association, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc.,191 “FN-Canada did not 
object to FN-US and the Board framing the issue as ‘use in 
commerce.’”192  The Board had apparently found that FN-Canada had 
“waived the right to argue its case on the correct lesser use 
requirement.”193  On appeal, FN-Canada did not challenge the 
Board’s assumption of waiver, arguing its use satisfied use in 
commerce.194  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit noted in a footnote 
that, “in future cases where a section 2(d) challenge is mounted, the 
Board should apply the correct test even where use in interstate or 
foreign commerce is alleged.”195  Applying the correct test, the 
Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in dismissing FN-Canada’s 
oppositions as the record revealed more than ample use of FN-
Canada’s marks in the United States to satisfy the use requirements of 
section 2(d).196
F. No “Excusable Neglect” 
1. FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc.197
In FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc.,198 the 
Federal Circuit reviewed a Board decision denying a FirstHealth 
motion to reopen the testimony period for failure to show “excusable 
neglect” and dismissing FirstHealth’s counterclaims.199
FirstHealth filed intent-to-use trademark applications for the mark 
FIRSTCAROLINACARE in connection with healthcare insurance 
claims administration and health maintenance organizations 
(“HMOs”).200  CareFirst opposed both applications, alleging a 
likelihood of confusion with, and dilution of, its mark CAREFIRST.201  
FirstHealth counterclaimed against CareFirst, seeking to cancel the 
 189.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  937 F.2d at 1578 n.4. 
 192.  First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 871 n.1. 
 196.  Id. at 871. 
 197.  479 F.3d 825 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. at 827–28. 
 200.  Id. at 827. 
 201.  Id. 
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trademark registrations for CAREFIRST “based on abandonment due 
to uncontrolled licensing of the mark and failure to use the mark in 
connection with services other than HMO services.”202
The parties had entered into a stipulation extending FirstHealth’s 
case-in-chief testimony period until January 31, 2004.203  Nearly a 
month later, on February 26, 2004, FirstHealth filed a motion to 
reopen its testimony period to introduce evidence to support its 
counterclaims, including discovery depositions, responses, and 
certified copies of third-party registrations.204  FirstHealth listed the 
birth of counsel’s son, the significant amount of testimony that was 
taken, time conflicts with counsel’s other matters, and a new 
paralegal’s docketing error as reasons for its late filing.205  However, 
the Board denied FirstHealth’s motion to reopen its testimony 
period, finding that it had not shown excusable neglect.206  Thus, the 
Board dismissed FirstHealth’s counterclaims for cancellation due to 
lack of supporting evidence.207  The Federal Circuit noted that the 
Board, in its initial ruling, “also dismissed CareFirst’s oppositions, 
finding that there was no likelihood of confusion with or dilution of 
[CareFirst’s] registered mark.”208
The Federal Circuit’s standard of review when examining whether 
the Board erred in denying a motion for failure to show excusable 
neglect is abuse of discretion.209  The court noted that, while the 
Board’s regulations do allow testimony periods to be reopened upon 
a showing of “excusable neglect,” they do not articulate the meaning 
of that term.210  As a result of this lack of a definition, FirstHealth 
argued on appeal that the Board had abused its discretion in 
applying the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Pioneer 
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership.211  The 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See id. (noting that the parties’ agreement was made pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.121).  This section of the Code of Federal Regulations permits parties to extend 
testimony periods by agreement and with the permission of the T.T.A.B.  37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.121(c) (2007). 
 204.  FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 827. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 828 (citation omitted). 
 209.  Id.; see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F.2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (stating that the relevant examination in excusable neglect cases is whether or 
not the Board abused its discretion when dismissing a motion or claim). 
 210.  FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829; see 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a) (observing that inter partes 
proceedings before the Board are generally governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
 211.  FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 828.  In Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. 
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Supreme Court laid out a definition for the term 
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Federal Circuit in FirstHealth explained that, under Pioneer, the 
determination of whether a party’s neglect is excusable is: 
[a]t bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant 
circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.  These include . . . 
[1] the danger of prejudice to the [non-moving party], [2] the 
length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was 
within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the 
movant acted in good faith.212
The Board adopted the Pioneer factors for determining excusable 
neglect in Pumpkin Ltd. v. Seed Corps.213 and held that the third 
factor—the reason for the delay and whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant—is the most important.214  The 
court in FirstHealth noted that while the Board was not required to 
adopt the interpretation of “excusable neglect” set forth in Pioneer, 
doing so was reasonable and the court would defer to that 
interpretation.215
The court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in 
denying FirstHealth’s motion.216  The reasons FirstHealth gave for the 
delay were wholly within its reasonable control.217  The Federal Circuit 
dismissed FirstHealth’s complaint of a “docketing error” as belied by 
FirstHealth’s own reference to the January 31, 2004 deadline in a 
motion it filed prior to the deadline’s expiration.218  As to 
FirstHealth’s claim that family matters caused delay, FirstHealth had 
failed to explain why other authorized individuals in the same firm 
“excusable neglect” while examining the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.  Id. 
at 395. 
 212.  FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829 (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395) (footnote 
omission and alterations in original). 
 213.   43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1582 (T.T.A.B. 1997).  In Pumpkin, the Board denied a 
motion to reopen the testimony period because the reason for delay—a docketing 
error—was “wholly within the reasonable control of the [the movant],” applying the 
third factor in Pioneer.  Id. at 1587.  Further, the Board noted that its interest in 
deterring delay due to “sloppy practice or inattention to deadlines” was relevant to 
the second Pioneer factor, and also weighed heavily against a finding of excusable 
neglect.  Id. at 1587–88. 
 214.  Old Nutfield Brewing Co. v. Hudson Valley Brewing Co., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1701, 1702 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (citing Pumpkin, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1586 n.7). 
 215.  FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829 (citing Custom Computer Servs., Inc. v. Paychex 
Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003), as “deferring to the Board’s 
interpretation of ‘mistake’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(b)”). 
 216.  Id. at 830. 
 217.  Id. at 829–30.  The stipulated motion that extended the testimony period to 
January 31, 2004 accounted for two of the reasons for the delay—FirstHealth’s 
witness schedules and conflicts with counsels’ schedules.  Id. 
 218.  Id. at 830. 
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could not have assumed responsibility for the case.219  Finding that, as 
in Pumpkin, the second and third factors weighed against excusable 
neglect, the Federal Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying FirstHealth’s motion to reopen the testimony 
period.220
The Federal Circuit also found the Board’s finding that FirstHealth 
failed to prove uncontrolled licensing or failure to use by a 
preponderance of the evidence was supported by substantial 
evidence.221  Without the properly excluded evidence, FirstHealth 
failed to meet its burden of proving abandonment by a 
preponderance of the evidence.222
2. Fischer v. Anderson223 and Fischer v. Quad International Inc.224
In Fischer v. Anderson,225 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s 
denial of Fischer’s motion for relief from judgment.226  The Board 
granted judgment against Fischer on the pleadings, sustaining 
Anderson’s opposition to Fischer’s application for registration of the 
mark CHLOE VEVRIER and refusing registration of the mark.227  
During the Board proceedings, Fischer was represented by counsel.228  
However, Fischer’s new counsel filed a motion for relief from 
judgment, claiming that prior counsel had been negligent in failing 
to respond to Anderson’s motion for judgment or the Board’s show 
cause order.229
The Board denied Fisher’s motion for relief from judgment 
because Fischer had not established that her failure to respond to the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings or the show cause order was 
 219.  See id. (“finding that a failure to explain why other authorized individuals 
could not have assumed responsibility after counsel’s death weighed against finding 
excusable neglect” (citing HKG Indus., Inc. v. Perma-Pipe, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156 
(T.T.A.B. 1998))). 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See id. (“Abandonment is a question of fact, and the Board’s findings are 
sustained if supported by substantial evidence.”  (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 
Anderson].  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  This case was not 
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. 
 224.  No. 2007-1153, 2007 WL 2947323, *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 
Quad Int’l, Inc.].  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  This case was not 
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. 
 225.  No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, *1. 
 226.  Id. at *1. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
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the result of “excusable neglect.”230  She had also failed to establish 
any other reason to justify relief from the judgment.231  The Board 
found that Fischer had not established excusable neglect because she 
was bound by the conduct of her prior counsel under Pioneer.232  The 
Board also denied Fischer’s motion for reconsideration, and she 
appealed.233
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, finding no 
merit in the three arguments Fischer presented on appeal.234  The 
court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in considering 
letters from Fisher’s prior counsel claiming that had he never 
received Anderson’s motion for judgment or the Board’s order to 
show cause.235  The papers at issue were mailed to prior counsel’s 
correct address and therefore were presumed to have been 
received.236  Nor did the Board abuse its discretion in not considering 
Fischer’s arguments that evidence in the record supported her claim 
that prior counsel was negligent in failing to respond, as Fischer is 
bound by the conduct of her prior counsel as a matter of law.237  
Finally, Fischer failed to show “extraordinary circumstances.”238  Her 
argument that prior counsel ignored repeated e-mails and telephone 
calls concerning her application, ignored her new counsel’s requests 
for her files, and improperly filed letters with the Board despite being 
fired were not relevant as these actions occurred after the date the 
Board granted judgment against Fischer on the pleadings.239
In Fischer v. Quad International Inc.,240 the companion case to Fischer 
v. Anderson, the Federal Circuit ruled that Fischer had not presented 
any arguments different from those presented in her appeal of the 
TTAB’s decision in the Anderson opposition.241  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision entering judgment 
 230.  Id.  Excusable neglect must be established under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).  Id. 
 231.  Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
 232.  Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *1.  Under Pioneer, the Board “was required 
to impute to Ms. Fischer her prior counsel’s acts or failures to act, thereby rendering 
irrelevant any distinction between [prior] counsel’s neglect and any neglect on 
[Fischer’s] part.”  Id.; see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 
U.S. 380, 396–97 (1993) (stating that clients must be held accountable for the acts 
and omissions of their attorneys because the attorney is a voluntarily chosen 
representative). 
 233.  Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *2. 
 234.  Id. at *2–3. 
 235.  Id. at *2. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396–97. 
 238.  Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *3. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  No. 2007-1153, 2007 WL 2947323, *1. 
 241.  Id. at *1. 
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against Fischer in the Quad opposition based upon the Board’s ruling 
that same day denying her motion for relief from judgment in the 
Anderson opposition.242
G. Notice of Appeal/Writ of Mandamus 
1. In re Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc.243
In In re Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc.,244 the Federal Circuit held 
that a writ of mandamus directing the TTAB to vacate its default 
judgment, which cancelled a trademark registration, should be 
construed as a notice of appeal.  Accordingly, mandamus relief was 
not appropriate.245
Advanced Renal Technologies (“ART”) petitioned the TTAB to 
cancel a registration owned by Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc. 
(“Rockwell”).246  Rockwell did not respond and the Board entered 
default judgment against Rockwell, canceling the trademark.247  
Rockwell appealed and, while on appeal, Rockwell and ART reached 
a settlement.248  The Federal Circuit remanded, and the parties jointly 
moved the TTAB to vacate its decision and reinstate the 
registration.249  The TTAB denied the parties’ motion for vacatur, 
determining the parties had failed to show “extraordinary 
circumstances,” and further denied Rockwell’s motion for 
reconsideration.250
The Federal Circuit noted that Rockwell’s petition was clearly 
intended as a request for relief in the form of a writ of mandamus.  
However, the court has broad discretion to consider whether such 
filing constitutes a notice of appeal251 and noted that, “to appeal a 
judgment of the TTAB, the party seeking appeal must file notice that 
sets forth (1) the name of each party to the proceeding, (2) the 
judgment, order, or part, thereof being appealed, and (3) the name 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  239 F. App’x 583 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. at 584–85 (“[H]olding that a party seeking a writ bears the burden of 
proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief, such as by appeal” (citing 
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989))); Bankers Life 
& Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (observing that “whatever may be 
done without the writ may not be done with it” (citation omitted)). 
 246.  Rockwell, 239 F. App’x at *584. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. (“[C]ourts should look at the notice afforded by a document rather than 
a litigant’s motivation in filing to determine whether a document constitutes a notice 
of appeal” (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992))). 
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of the court to which the appeal is taken.”252  The court found that 
Rockwell’s petition clearly met these requirements and that 
Rockwell’s petition was timely if treated as a notice of appeal.253  
Further, the court has jurisdiction over the TTAB’s decision to deny 
vacatur.254
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A. Res Judicata 
1. In re Bose Corp.255
In In re Bose Corp. (Bose II),256 the Federal Circuit applied the 
doctrine of res judicata257 to preclude Bose Corporation (“Bose”) 
from re-applying for trademark protection for the design of a 
loudspeaker system.258
This case involves a “long and tortuous prosecution history” that 
spans almost thirty years.259  In sum, Bose had applied for trademark 
protection for the design of its loudspeaker system in 1977.260  In that 
application, Bose described its configuration as “an enclosure and its 
image of substantially pentagonal cross section with a substantially 
pentagonal-shaped top parallel to a substantially pentagonal-shaped 
bottom.”261  Bose’s loudspeaker system design is depicted below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 252.  Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)). 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See id. (“[A] party to a cancellation proceeding who is dissatisfied with the 
decision of the TTAB may appeal . . . .” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000))). 
 255.  476 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Bose II]. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id.  Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars re-litigation of the same cause of 
action.  The doctrine applies where (1) the parties are identical, (2) there was a prior 
final judgment on the merits of the claim at issue, and (3) the merits of the second 
claim are based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.  See Sharp Kabushiki 
Kaisha v. ThinkSharp, Inc., 448 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Mayer/Berkshire 
Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 258.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333. 
 259.  In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 WL 1787217, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 
2005) (citing In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 260.  In re Bose Corp. (Bose I), 772 F.2d 866, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 261.  Id. 
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After multiple appeals and remands, in 1985, the Federal Circuit 
ultimately found Bose’s design functional and not worthy of 
trademark protection (Bose I).262  Among other reasons, it found that 
Bose’s advertisements touted the utilitarian advantages of its 
pentagonal design and that the pentagonal design was previously 
subject to a utility patent.263
In 1995, Bose re-applied for trademark protection for its 
loudspeaker system design and submitted a revised description of the 
mark.264  In its application, Bose defined the configuration of its 
loudspeaker as follows:  “[A]n enclosure and its image of substantially 
pentagonal cross-section with a substantially pentagonal shaped top 
with a bowed edge parallel to a substantially pentagonal-shaped bottom 
end.”265
Bose argued that the additional element of “a bowed edge” in its 
1995 trademark application constituted a changed circumstance that 
would override application of res judicata.266  Bose explained that the 
bowed edge is an “arbitrary flourish” that entitled it to trade dress 
protection.267  It further argued that its submission of promotional 
materials demonstrates that Bose does not tout the utilitarian 
advantage of its bowed design.268  Lastly, Bose argued that new 
 262.  See Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333; see also Bose I, 772 F.2d at 867.  When 
determining whether a design mark is functional, the Federal Circuit applies the 
Morton-Norwich factors, which ask (1) whether there is a utility patent showing the 
utilitarian function of the proposed design, (2) whether the applicant’s 
advertisements disclose the utilitarian advantages of its design, (3) whether there are 
facts showing the availability of alternative designs; and (4) whether the design is the 
result of simple or intricate manufacturing procedures.  In re Morton-Norwich Prods, 
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 263.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333. 
 264.  See id. (pointing out the 1995 application). 
 265.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 266.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 267.  See In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 WL 1787217, at *4 n.7 (T.T.A.B. 
Apr. 26, 2005) (citing Applicant’s brief).  Bose did not otherwise alter the design of 
its speaker system in the interim.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333. 
 268.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1335. 
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precedent on functionality changed the analysis of its loudspeaker 
design.269
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected Bose’s 1995 application as 
barred by res judicata.270  The Federal Circuit found that the parties 
to Bose I and Bose II were identical, that the court had already issued a 
final opinion as to the functionality of Bose’s speaker design, and that 
the two applications involved the same set of transactional facts.271  As 
to Bose’s contention that the circumstances had changed, the court 
observed that “we expressly acknowledged in Bose I that the ‘curved 
front edge’ was part of the Bose design in our functionality 
analysis.”272  Regarding the promotional materials, the Federal Circuit 
stated that the materials demonstrate the utilitarian advantages of the 
design as a whole.273  Whether the materials lack language regarding 
the utility of the “bowed” edge is irrelevant, the court noted, because 
Bose’s application is for the design as a whole and not just the bowed 
edge.274
Lastly, the Federal Circuit dismissed Bose’s argument that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays,275 
altered the functionality analysis.276  TrafFix addressed an applicant’s 
attempt to register an arbitrary element of a patented design, not the 
design as a whole.277  The Federal Circuit found this language 
inapposite because Bose sought registration of its entire loudspeaker 
design and not just the bowed edge.278  Having dismissed each of 
Bose’s arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision below.279
2. International Flora Technologies, Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba 
Co.280
In International Flora Technologies, Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba Co.,281 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the Board’s holding that 
International Flora Technologies, Ltd. (“Flora”) was barred by res 
 269.  Bose argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing 
Displays, 523 U.S. 23 (2001), changed the functionality analysis because the Court 
noted that an attempt to protect arbitrary features of a patent—such as a bowed 
edge—might yield a different result.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1335–36. 
 270.  Id. at 1334 (reviewing the Board’s decision de novo). 
 271.  Id. at 1337. 
 272.  Id. at 1335–36. 
 273.  Id. at 1336–37. 
 274.  See id. at 1336 (noting that “bowed” is just another word for “curved”). 
 275.  523 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 276.  Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1336. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. at 1337. 
 280.  243 F. App’x 619 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 281.  Id. 
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judicata from filing a cancellation action against Desert Whale Jojoba 
Co., Ltd.’s (“Jojoba”) mark JOJOBASOMES.282
Jojoba sought to register JOJOBASOMES in connection with “skin 
soaps, essential oils for personal use, cosmetics, and hair lotions” in 
International Class 3.283  Flora opposed Jojoba’s application for 
JOJOBASOMES based on its ownership of registrations for the marks 
METASOMES, FLORASOMES, JOJOBEADS, and JOJOBUTTER in 
International Classes 1 and 3.284  Flora argued that confusion would 
likely occur under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act.285
Flora improperly introduced evidence showing ownership of its 
registrations during the assigned testimony period of the Opposition 
Proceeding.286  Under prior Rule 2.122(d) of the USPTO,287 Flora was 
required to make its registrations of record “by appropriate 
identification and introduction during the taking of testimony or by 
filing a notice of reliance . . . showing both the current status of and 
current title to the registration.”288  Flora merely attached printouts of 
its registrations from the USPTO to its opposition brief.289  Because 
Flora did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 2.122(d), the Board 
dismissed Flora’s opposition as a default judgment.290
Once Jojoba obtained a registration for JOJOBASOMES, Flora 
petitioned to cancel the mark on the same grounds.291  The issue 
before the Board, and before the Federal Circuit on appeal, was 
whether the prior default judgment constituted a decision on the 
merits such that res judicata would bar Flora’s cancellation action.292
Flora argued that its failure to abide by Rule 2.122(d) was a 
procedural deficiency that did not result in a final judgment being 
issued on the merits of its claim.293  However, the Board disagreed and 
 282.  Id. at 620; Int’l Flora Techs., Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba Co., No. 92045643, 
2006 WL 3192313, *1 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 283.  See Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *1 (citing the registration 
application). 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id.; see supra note 179. 
 286.  Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *2. 
 287.  37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) (2007). 
 288.  Id. at 2.122(d)(2). 
 289.  Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *2. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. at *1. 
 292.  Id.  As noted in supra note 257, a second suit is barred by res judicata if 
(1) the parties are identical, (2) the same set of transactional facts are at issue, and 
(3) a final judgment has already been issued on the merits of the claim at issue.  The 
Board did not discuss in great detail requirements (1) and (2), which were easily 
met. 
 293.  Id. at *2. 
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dismissed Flora’s petition to cancel, holding that “even default 
judgments give rise to res judicata.”294
Notable for today’s practitioner, the circumstances that resulted in 
Flora’s default judgment are no longer relevant.  On August 31, 2007, 
Rule 2.122(d) was amended to allow a party to attach photocopies of 
its registrations to original opposition and cancellation 
proceedings.295  Although the appeal was decided by the Federal 
Circuit on September 10, 2007, the amendment could not assist Flora 
because the amendment only applied to proceedings commenced on 
or after August 31, 2007.296
B. Failure to State a Claim 
1. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.297
The Federal Circuit considered only one case during the 2007 term 
on appeal from the federal district courts.298  In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel 
Corp.,299 the Federal Circuit reversed the Southern District of Texas on 
two straightforward procedural questions involving pleading 
requirements and genericness, reiterating the low pleading threshold 
for trademark infringement claims, especially in cases where a 
plaintiff proceeds pro se.300
In McZeal, the pro se plaintiff submitted a ninety-five page 
complaint claiming infringement of his patent and trademark rights 
to INTERNATIONAL WALKIE TALKIE.301  After the plaintiff’s 
hearing for a preliminary injunction, the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas dismissed the complaint under Federal 
 294.  Id. at *3 (citing Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q. 
1492, 1494 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 295.  See Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 72 
Fed. Reg. 42242 (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com 
/sol/notices/72fr42242_FinalRuleChart.pdf. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 298.  See id. (reviewing dismissal by the lower court for failure to state a claim); 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000) (providing that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from a final 
decision of a district court of the United States” for patent disputes under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338 (emphasis added)); see also Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 490 F.3d 1340, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over 
the parties’ claims under the final judgment rule because the contempt order was 
not final).  McZeal involved both patent and trademark claims and therefore 
jurisdiction was proper.  McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1354. 
 299.  501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 300.  Id. at 1358–59. 
 301.  Id. at 1355. 
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Rule 12(b)(6) because “[t]here just aren’t any facts” supporting the 
plaintiff’s patent and trademark infringement claim.302
Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit observed that a 
claim can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to 
allege facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.303  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit cited Supreme Court and Fifth 
Circuit precedent applying a lower pleading standard for pro se 
plaintiffs.304
In the context of a motion to dismiss a claim of trademark 
infringement, the Federal Circuit stated that: 
a plaintiff must plead that a defendant uses a designation in 
interstate commerce and in connection with goods or services 
where the designation is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or 
deception as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the 
defendant with another person, and the plaintiff has been or is 
likely to be damaged by these acts.305
In reviewing the complaint, the Federal Circuit found that the 
plaintiff alleged that:  (1) Sprint Nextel uses the INTERNATIONAL 
WALKIE TALKIE mark (2) for identical telecom services, (3) which is 
likely to confuse consumers (4) as to the source of the plaintiff’s 
identical mark and (5) which is causing the plaintiff irreparable 
economic loss.306  This, according to the Federal Circuit, clearly met 
the pleading requirement of 12(b)(6) for pro se litigants.307
The Federal Circuit also noted that the Southern District of Texas 
improperly observed in its order that the INTERNATIONAL 
WALKIE TALKIE mark is generic.308  Genericness is a question of fact 
improperly resolved on a motion to dismiss.309
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. at 1356 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 
2002)). 
 304.  Id. (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 
986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 305.  Id. at 1358 (citation omitted). 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id.; see McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. H-06-1775 2006 WL 4792779, at *1 
(S.D. Tex. June 20, 2006). 
 309.  McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1358. 
 1072 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1039 
                                                          
C. Standing 
1. McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent310
 In McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent,311 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of an opposition to 
a motorcycle group’s application to register the trademark DYKES 
ON BIKES for lack of standing.312
The San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent (“SFWMC”) 
applied to register the mark DYKES ON BIKES for education and 
entertainment services.313  Initially the examiner refused to register 
the mark, stating that the word “dyke” was disparaging to lesbians.314  
After the Board remanded the case, the examiner considered 
additional evidence and approved the application for publication.315  
Michael J. McDermott timely opposed and SFWMC moved to dismiss 
the opposition for lack of standing and failure to state a legal basis for 
the opposition.316  The Board granted SFWMC’s motion to dismiss, 
holding that McDermott lacked standing to oppose the mark’s 
registration because he failed to establish a reasonable belief that the 
registration would cause him damage.317
McDermott challenged the mark as “disparaging based on the 
inclusion of the term ‘dykes’” and also “alleged that it is comprised of 
scandalous and immoral material because the mark in full is 
associated with a pattern of illegal activity by the group applying for 
registration of the mark.”318
McDermott, however, had not shown that he would be damaged by 
the registration.  He could not show that he possesses a trait or 
characteristic that is clearly and directly implicated in the proposed 
mark because McDermott is a man and the registration would have 
 310.  240 F. App’x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  The Federal Circuit opinion is not 
published.  However, the TTAB’s decision is citable as precedent.  81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1212 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 311.  240 F. App’x 865. 
 312.  Id. at 867 (holding that standing is a question of law and thereby reviewing 
the Board’s decision de novo (citing Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 
1256, 1262–63 (Fed. Cir. 2007))). 
 313.  Id. at 866. 
 314.  Id.  No trademark shall be refused registration on the count of its nature 
unless it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
 315.  McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 866. 
 316.  Id. at 866–67. 
 317.  Id. at 867.  The court did not find that McDermott had sufficiently pled a 
“real interest” under Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  Id. 
 318.  McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 867. 
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no “implications” for a man.319  Nor did McDermott make any claim 
in his opposition papers or present evidence demonstrating that 
others share his belief.320  Finding no other basis to provide 
McDermott with sufficient standing to enable him to oppose the 
registration, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of the 
opposition for lack of standing.321
CONCLUSION 
While many of the Federal Circuit opinions simply affirmed Board 
decisions, the court did not hesitate to clarify the law (as to mere use 
being sufficient to oppose an application)322—or redirect the Board’s 
thinking (such as consideration of foreign information available on 
the Internet)323 —where the court clearly disagreed with the Board’s 
decision.  On issues of the mechanics of obtaining the registration, 
the court appropriately deferred to the Board.  The one case the 
Federal Circuit considered from a district court was reversed,324 
reiterating the low pleading threshold in federal court, particularly 
from pro se plaintiffs.  While many of the cases were decided on long-
standing precedent, they are nonetheless instructive for today’s 
practitioner. 
 319.  Id.  In Ritchie, the court explained that an opposer of a mark’s registration 
must have both a real interest in the proceedings and a reasonable basis for a belief 
that he would be damaged by the registration.  Id. (citing Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095).  
“[O]ne method of establishing the reasonableness of belief of damage for purposes 
of standing is for the opposer to allege he possesses a trait or characteristic that is 
clearly and directly implicated in the proposed mark.”  Id. (quoting Ritchie, 170 F.3d 
at 1098). 
 320.  Id.  In Ritchie, the court stated that “‘[a]nother means that may be used to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of . . . belief of damage is to allege that others also 
share the same belief of harm’ . . . as demonstrated through surveys, petitions, or 
affidavits from public interest groups.”  170 F.3d at 1098. 
 321.  McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 868. 
 322.  See supra notes 175–196 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See supra notes 30–51 and accompanying text. 
 324.  See supra notes 299–309 and accompanying text. 
